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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2-2(4) UCA 78-2a-3 (2) (h) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making an 
award of alimony? 
The standard of review in considering an award of alimony is 
an abuse of discretion standard. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 
P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 1995). Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
Alimony was one of the central issues of the case. (R. at 84-
85). The issue was preserved for appeal in the arguments of both 
counsel. (R. at 183-189). 
II. Did the trial court err in granting appellee an 
equitable interest in the home? 
As above the standard of review is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 
1995). Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) . 
Distribution of property including an interest in the home, 
was one of the central issues of the case. (R. at 84-85). The 
issue was preserved for appeal in the arguments of both counsel. 
(R. at 183-189). 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules of 
central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: This is a divorce case with 
contested issues involving the division of personal and real 
property, and alimony. 
B. Statement of Facts: The parties were married in 1992. 
(R. at 42) . They separated four years later on June 6, 1996. 
(R. at 8, 86). Divorce proceedings followed. (R. at 1) At the 
time of the marriage each of the parties owned a home. (R. at 
85-86) . The trial court awarded appellee (hereinafter 
defendant) an equitable interest in appellant's (hereinafter 
plaintiff) home in the amount of $12,000.00 (R. at 48). The 
trial court also awarded alimony to appellee in the amount of 
$500.00 per month for four years. (R. at 47). The defendant 
purchased another home after separation. (R. at 49) . Both 
parties were employed before and during the marriage, and after 
separation. (See exhibits 48, 49, 50 and 54). 
C. Proceedings Below: Plaintiff filed the complaint in 
this matter on June 18, of 1996. (R. at 1). Defendant answered 
on July 22, 1996. (R. at 5). Plaintiff's counsel withdrew on 
January 30, 1997) . (R. at 29) . Substitute counsel appeared on 
Jan 31, 1997. (R. at 34). Trial was held on May 14, and 19, 
1997. (R. at 39, 42). Findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
a decree of divorce were entered on July 2, 1997. (R. at 46, 
2 
57) . Notice of appeal was filed by substituted counsel on July 
17, 1997) (R. at 69). Notice of cross-appeal was filed on July 
31, 1997. (R. at 73). (Note: Plaintiff's current counsel was 
retained after the docketing statement was filed, and the 
briefing period had commenced). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The first issue on appeal considers whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in making an award of alimony. The 
standard of review in considering an award of alimony is an abuse 
of discretion standard. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah law requires consideration of at 
least three factors before awarding alimony. Those factors are: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient 
income; and (3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide 
support.7" Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 
1993) . Examination of the record in the case at bar demonstrates 
that with respect to the issue of alimony the trial court in 
reality made conclusions without considering the required factors 
or making the required findings which must support an alimony 
award. (R. at 46-56). A trial court abuses its discretion when 
it fails to consider the enumerated factors. Willey v. Willey, 
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993). On the first issue for 
appeal, remand is required for additional findings to determine 
whether the award of alimony is factually supported. Because the 
findings are inadequate, marshaling of the evidence is not 
3 
necessary. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
The second issue on appeal considers whether the trial court 
erred in granting appellee an equitable interest in plaintiff's 
premarital home. The standard of review is an abuse of 
discretion standard. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
App. 1987) . On this issue the trial court made what were in 
effect conclusions of law rather than findings of fact. (R. at 
46-56) . 
Under Utah law there is a presumption that ownership of 
premarital property remains with the spouse who brought the 
property into the marriage. Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 
706 (Utah 1982). Where premarital property is considered as part 
of an equitable division of property, 14 factors have been 
outlined for consideration by trial court. Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). In the case at bar, the trial court 
only considered a few of the fourteen factors. (R. at 46-56) . 
On the issue of contribution by defendant to the appreciation of 
plaintiff's home during the marriage, the court found erroneously 
based on marshaled evidence. As in the first issue above, the 
findings of fact are not sufficient to support the finding of the 
trial court. On this issue, plaintiff seeks reversal of the 
finding regarding contribution to the appreciation of the home, 
and remand for consideration of the required factors for awarding 
an equitable interest in premarital property. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE TO 
SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
The first issue on appeal is set forth in the docketing 
statement as follows: Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in making an award of alimony? The standard of review in 
considering an award of alimony is an abuse of discretion 
standard. In Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
App. 1995), the court set forth the standard in the following 
manner: 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony . . . and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 817 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1991) . We review a trial court's 
conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court. Id. 
If, however, we are charged with the task of reviewing the 
trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the 
findings are clearly erroneous. Id. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 
905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) . 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony 
because the findings of fact of the trial court are not adequate 
to support the award. URCP Rule 52 (c) demonstrates the 
necessity of adequate factual findings in domestic cases. The 
rule indicates that findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
necessary in divorce cases in that they cannot be waived. In the 
case at bar, in effect, the trial court entered conclusions 
without the support of specific findings. The " . . . omission of 
particular findings in alimony awards is an abuse of discretion." 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . The findings that were entered in the case at bar are 
5 
inadequate, and do not support the alimony award. 
Under Utah law, the "function of alimony is to provide 
support for the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living [he or] she enjoyed during the marriage, and 
to prevent the [receiving spouse] from becoming a public charge." 
Jones v. Jones, 700 p.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); (quoting English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). In attempting to 
achieve the goals of an alimony award, the Utah appellate courts 
have indicated very specifically the factors which must be 
considered and the findings which must be made in making an award 
of alimony. In Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
App. 1996) , the court stated: 
It is well grounded in Utah law that the trial court must 
consider: "x (1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse 
to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
supporting spouse to provide support.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey, 
854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). A 
trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider 
the enumerated factors. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550 
(Utah App. 1993) . "Thus, xthe trial court must make 
sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon'" the 
required factors. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, 
"' [i]f sufficient findings are not made, we must reverse 
unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as would 
allow us to apply the factors as a matter of law on 
appeal.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
In the case at bar, the findings of fact of the trial court 
are not adequate to support the alimony award. Unfortunately, 
the record is controverted and the matter will require remand to 
make the necessary factual determinations. 
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The findings of fact made by the trial court regarding 
alimony are as follows: 
5. The Plaintiff is fully capable of supporting himself and 
to pay the obligations incurred during the marriage. (R. at 
47) . 
6. The Defendant is in need of support from the Plaintiff 
and the Plaintiff has the ability to pay support based on 
his past and current income. Furthermore, the Defendant is 
entitled to live at the same standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage now that the parties are divorced. The 
court finds that the Defendant's current situation and 
standard of living is less than what she enjoyed during the 
marriage and the Court awards alimony to the Defendant in 
order to more equalize the parties's respective current 
financial positions. Based thereon, the Defendant should be 
awarded a sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony 
from Plaintiff, beginning June 1, 1997, and continuing each 
month thereafter for a period of four (4) years, or until 
Defendant remarries, whichever occurs first. (R. at 47). 
(See exhibit I) . 
Comparison of the findings of fact made by the trial court 
to the requirements set forth in Marshall, make it apparent that 
none of the required findings were made by the trial court. 
The first alimony related finding is designated as number 5 
above. Finding number 5 concludes that the plaintiff is capable 
of supporting himself and paying the obligations of the marriage. 
(R. at 47). 
This finding is inadequate first, because it is although it 
is contained in the findings of fact, it is in reality a 
conclusion of law. In considering findings of fact which are in 
reality conclusions of law, appellate courts disregard labels and 
look to substance. Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National 
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988); Demetropoulos 
v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 963 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If the 
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court determines that finding of fact number 5 is in fact a 
conclusion of law, it would be reviewed under a correctness 
standard. State Ex Rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista 
Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990) . Under a correctness review 
finding of fact number 5 requires reversal as it is unsupported 
by any factual findings. See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987); Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
Second, finding of fact number 5 fails to consider or 
determine either the plaintiff's financial obligations or his 
income. Third, the finding fails to indicate what obligations of 
the marriage plaintiff is capable of paying. Finally, the 
finding fails to consider the ability of the plaintiff to provide 
support, or the plaintiff's financial needs. " [T]he payor 
spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in 
determining the ability to provide support." Willey v. Willev, 
866 P.2d 547, 551 & n.l (Utah App. 1993) . 
Finding of fact number 6 suffers from the same deficiencies 
as finding of fact number 5. Review of finding of fact number 6 
demonstrates that it too is in reality a conclusion of law. The 
first sentence of the finding concludes that defendant needs 
support and that Plaintiff can pay based on his past and current 
income. (R. at 47). The conclusions regarding payment and 
receipt of support are made without any finding as to the past or 
present income of the parties, or their respective needs. (R. at 
47) . 
Examination of the findings of fact make it evident that 
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there was no consideration of " . . . the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to support him or herself." Willev v. Willey, 866 P. 2d 
547, 551 8c n.l (Utah App. 1993). 
Finding of fact number 6 also concludes that . . . "the 
Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than 
what she enjoyed during the marriage. . . ." ' (R. at 47) This 
finding is deficient because the court has not made findings 
regarding the current situation or what the standard of living 
was during the marriage. (R. at 46-56) . The findings of fact of 
the trial court fail as a matter of law to support an award of 
alimony. 
The comments of this court in Breinholt regarding the effect 
of deficient findings of fact apply strongly in the case at bar: 
In the case at bar, the trial court made no findings of 
defendant's financial needs as required, nor did it make 
findings of plaintiff's financial needs. An "underlying 
factual determination. . . required for an assessment" of 
plaintiff's ability to provide support. Willev, 866 P.2d at 
551. Although each party testified regarding their monthly 
expenses, the trial court did not enter findings regarding 
the reasonableness of the expenses. Based on this failure, 
"we remand for findings on each party's reasonable needs so 
we can determine if the court abused its discretion in 
setting the amount . . . of the alimony award." Id. 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 1995) . 
Because of the inadequacy of the factual findings, the award of 
alimony in this matter should be reversed, and the case should be 
remanded to the trial court. 
II. A MARSHALING STANDARD DOES NOT APPLY WHERE FACTUAL FINDINGS 
ARE CHALLENGED FOR INADEQUACY. 
Ordinarily, when an appellant challenges the factual 
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findings of a trial court a marshaling standard applies. 
Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995) . 
When the sufficiency of the findings rather than the findings 
themselves are challenged, no marshaling is required. In 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991), this 
court stated: 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the 
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they 
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. 
In other words, the way to attack findings which appear to 
be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is to 
marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the 
evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where 
the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not go 
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can 
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings 
as framed. As explained in the next section, whatever may 
be said of the extent to which the trial court's intended 
findings lack evidentiary support, the more immediate 
problem in this case is the inadequacy of the findings. 
In the case at bar, marshaling the evidence would be futile 
because as demonstrated above, the required factual 
determinations were never made. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE 
AWARD TO DEFENDANT OF AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN PLAINTIFF'S 
HOME. 
The second issue on appeal is set forth in the docketing 
statement as follows: Did the trial court err in granting 
appellee an equitable interest in the home? The standard of 
review when considering a trial court's division of property is 
an abuse of discretion standard. This court stated: "This court 
will not disturb the trial court's decision [concerning property 
division] unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
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discretion." Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (UtahApp. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The findings of fact which were entered by the trial court 
respecting the award to defendant of an equitable interest in 
plaintiff's home are as follows: 
8 . The Plaintiff should be awarded the home and real 
property acquired prior to this marriage relationship as his 
sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon, 
and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
9. The Court finds that the home had a value of $108,000.00 
at the beginning of the marriage and that at the time of the 
separation of the parties, the home had a value of 
$132,000.00 Based thereon, the Court finds that the net 
equity in the home accumulated during the marriage amounts 
to $24,000.00 of which the Defendant should be awarded one-
half. The Defendant helped make the payments of the home, 
make improvements to the home, and over-all participated in 
appreciated value of the home and real property during the 
marriage. 
10. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant should receive an 
equitable lien in the home and real property in the amount 
of $12,000.00, which represents one-half (1/2) of the equity 
acquired during the marriage. Said equity shall be payable 
to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If 
Plaintiff fails to pay Defendant said equity within the 
three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall be awarded a 
judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and 
said judgment shall begin to accrue interest at the 
statutory rate beginning June 1, 2 000. 
11. The Defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver 
a Quit Claim Deed to the plaintiff upon full payment of said 
equity. 
12. The Defendant should be awarded the home and real 
property she has purchased since the date of separation as 
her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the 
Plaintiff, subject to the debt thereon and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. (R. at 48-49) . (See appendix 
I) . 
The usual presumption in divorce cases is that premarital 
property is retained by the party by whom it was brought into the 
11 
marriage. 
As a general rule, however, premarital property is viewed as 
separate property, and equity usually requires that "each 
party retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage," Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). See also: Walters v. Walters 812 P.2d 64, 
67 (Utah App, 1991). 
Finding of fact number 8 reaches the proper conclusion which 
is that the plaintiff should retain the home which he brought 
into the marriage. (R. at 48), Having reached that conclusion, 
however, findings 9-12 award the defendant an equitable interest 
in plaintiff's home. (R. at 48). This court must therefore 
determine whether the record supports the trial court's award of 
the equitable interest in premarital property. 
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) the court 
set forth 14 factors which are to be considered by a trial court 
when determining whether assets obtained prior to a marriage 
should be considered in an equitable property distribution. 
Those factors are: (1) The amount and kind of property to be 
divided. (2) Whether the property was acquired before or during 
the marriage. (3) The source of the property. (4) The health 
of the parties. (5) The parties standard of living. (6) The 
parties respective financial conditions. (7) The parties needs. 
(8) The parties earning capacity. (9) The duration of the 
marriage. (10) The parties' ages at the time of marriage and of 
divorce. (11) What the parties gave up by the marriage. (12) 
The relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support awarded. (13) Whether one spouse has 
made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of 
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the other spouse. (14) Whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. Burke at 135. 
Proper review of the case at bar requires comparison of the 
findings of fact dealing with the award of an equitable interest 
in plaintiff's home with the factors set forth above. 
Examination of the record demonstrates that of the fourteen 
factors set forth above, the trial court made findings, or at 
least reached conclusions regarding only four of the factors. 
They are factors 1, 2, and 3 which consider the kind of property, 
when it was acquired, and the source of the property, and factor 
9 which is the duration of the marriage. Factors 13 and 14 also 
received some discussion by the trial court, although the 
conclusions reached by the court are not supported by the 
evidence marshaled below. 
The following paragraphs set forth each of the other Burke 
factors, and examine what if any consideration they were given by 
the trial court. 
The fourth factor for consideration under Burke, is the 
health of the parties. Examination of the record makes it 
evident that this factor was not considered by the trial court. 
(R. at 46-56) . This factor is important because health concerns 
are one of the justifications for considering premarital property 
in a property distribution. 
The fifth factor is the parties standard of living. In 
finding of fact number 6, the trial court concluded that "the 
Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than 
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what she enjoyed during the marriage. . . " (R. at 47). As set 
forth under point I above, the trial court in concluded that 
defendant's standard of living was "less," at the time of 
divorce, but did so without making any findings as to what that 
standard of living was for the parties before or during the 
marriage. (R. at 46-56). A finding regarding standard of living 
is critical to an equitable property settlement. 
The sixth factor is the parties' respective financial 
conditions. In finding of fact number 5 the court concluded that 
plaintiff was "capable of supporting himself and to pay the 
obligations incurred during the marriage." The court further 
concluded in finding of fact number 6 that " . . . Plaintiff has 
the ability to pay support based on his past and current income." 
(R. at 47). These conclusions were reached without any 
discussion or findings regarding the incomes of the parties, or 
of their obligations. (R. at 46-56). In effect there were no 
findings on the respective financial conditions of the parties. 
The seventh factor considers the needs of the parties. 
Presumably this is a consideration of the financial needs of the 
parties. The findings of fact contain no consideration of the 
debts of the parties, their obligations, their incomes, or their 
ability to meet ongoing financial obligations. (R. at 46-56). 
The eighth factor for consideration is the earning capacity 
of the parties. While there was evidence presented at trial 
regarding the earnings of the parties based on tax returns, (See 
exhibits 48, 49, 50 and 54) , the trial court failed to make any 
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findings regarding the incomes of the parties, or their earning 
capacity. (R. at 46-56). 
Factor number ten examines the ages of the parties at the 
time of marriage and divorce. This factor was not considered by 
the trial court. (R. at 46-56) . 
The eleventh Burke factor is what the parties gave up by the 
marriage. The trial court made no findings regarding this 
factor. (R. at 46-56). 
Factor 12 is the relationship the property division has with 
the amount of alimony and child support awarded. Child support 
was not a factor in this case as there were no children born of 
the union. (R. at 47) . Examination of the record makes it 
evident that the trial court did not consider any relationship 
between the substantial alimony which was awarded, and the 
distribution of property. (R. at 46-56) . 
The thirteenth factor is whether one spouse has made any 
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the 
other spouse. The trial court concluded that " . . . Defendant 
helped make the payments on the home, make improvements to the 
home, and over-all participated in appreciative value of the home 
and real property during the marriage." (R. at 48). This 
finding by the trial court suffers from several deficiencies. 
The first deficiency is that the finding is in reality a 
conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Assuming 
arguendo that the statement above constitutes a finding of fact, 
the finding is not supported by the evidence. 
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Whenever a factual finding of a trial court is challenged, 
the challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings in question.11 Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 
P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995) . Plaintiff does not 
dispute that part of defendant's income was deposited into a 
joint checking account from which payments for the home and other 
expenses were made. (R. at 93). In offset, plaintiff's income 
was used to make the payments on defendant'7 s home until it was 
sold. (R. at 94, 169, 170, 204) . Further, defendant had 
approximately $18,375.00 in Zion's First National Bank at the 
time of the marriage, yet plaintiff was not awarded any share of 
the appreciation of that asset. (R. at 162, 163). (R. at 54). 
(See trial exhibit 39) . 
Plaintiff strongly disputes the finding that defendant 
helped "make improvements to the home, and over-all participated 
in appreciative value of the home and real property during the 
marriage." (R. at 48). The only evidence regarding defendant's 
participation in contributing to any appreciation of the home 
came by way of Defendant's exhibit number 12. (See appendix II) . 
The marshaled evidence therefore consists of exhibit 12. 
Defendant testified that exhibit 12 demonstrates the improvements 
to the home during the marriage. (R. at 135) . Defendant 
testified that improvements totaling $12,500.00 were made to the 
home during the marriage. (R. at 135). Defendant did not offer 
specific testimony or evidence as to how the $12,500.00 figure 
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was reached. 
Plaintiff testified specifically about the improvements set 
forth on exhibit 12, and offered supporting exhibits. (R. at 
178-180). Defendant's exhibit number 12 indicated that the cost 
of running natural gas to the home was $3,000.00. Plaintiff's 
testimony which was supported by exhibit 55 (an invoice from the 
gas company)(See appendix III), demonstrates that there was no 
charge for connecting plaintiff's home to the natural gas 
distribution system. The exhibit only shows a minimal charge for 
pipe. (R. at 178). Defendant's exhibit number 12 lists a 
cost of $2,000.00 for installation of a gas fireplace. Plaintiff 
testified that he received the fireplace on a work trade for 
$700.00, and that no money was actually paid. (R. at 179) . The 
fireplace was obtained and installed entirely based on 
plaintiff s efforts. 
Defendant's exhibit 12 claimed that $3,000.00 was paid for 
landscaping on the home. Plaintiff testified that the 
landscaping consisted of installation of gravel driveways and 
concrete curb. The invoices for the gravel and concrete are 
plaintiff's exhibit 57. (See appendix IV). Plaintiff's 
testimony, supported by^exhibit 57 was that the gravel driveway 
and concrete curb cost approximately $700.00. (R. at 179). 
The china cabinet described on exhibit 12 should not be 
considered a home improvement, as it was an item of personal 
property listed on Plaintiff's exhibit 4. (R. at 38-39). (See 
appendix V). The china cabinet was awarded to plaintiff by the 
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trial court as part of the distribution of personal property. 
(R. at 50). (See exhibit I). 
Examination of the evidence regarding defendant's 
contribution to the appreciated value of the home demonstrates 
that her evidence regarding value is not credible, and that her 
participation in the appreciated value of the home was negligible 
or non-existent. The marshaled evidence consists entirely of 
exhibit 12, which is not supported when compared to the direct 
supported evidence offered by plaintiff. 'The trial court's 
finding about defendant's contribution to the appreciated value 
of the home must be reversed. 
There is no evidence in the record indicating that any of 
the improvements in which defendant claims to have participated, 
or the payments which she claims to have made, increased the 
value of the home as found by the trial court. In many ways the 
case at bar is similar to Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 
1987) . In Burke a husband was seeking a share of the 
appreciation in value of assets which the wife received as part 
of her inheritance. Husband's claim was denied. The court 
considered the above factors and determined that the appreciation 
occurred because of changes in land values rather than from a 
contribution from husband: 
. . . Furthermore, except for having urged the plaintiff to 
take her inheritance in land rather than in cash, defendant 
concedes that he made no contribution toward the increase in 
value of the acreage in question and that the income came 
solely from the effects of inflation on land values. Burke, 
at 135. 
The only evidence regarding a reason for an increase in the 
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valuation of plaintiff's home was given by Joseph Stott, 
Plaintiff's appraiser. Mr. Stott testified about a general 
increase in land values in Sevier County which occurred during 
the parties' marriage. (R. at 103). 
The final factor for consideration of distribution of 
premarital assets under Burke, is whether the assets were 
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. In 
the case at bar, it is evident that the home was built by the 
efforts of plaintiff. (R. at 48). As set forth above, any 
increase in the value of the home during the time of the marriage 
occurred because of a general increase in property values and not 
due to any efforts or contributions of the defendant. 
Upon careful analysis it is obvious that the findings of the 
trial court are inadequate to support the award of an equitable 
interest in plaintiff's home to defendant. Further, the finding 
regarding defendant's contribution to the appreciation of the 
home is not supported by the marshaled evidence. This court's 
statement in Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) is 
particularly applicable to this case: 
Before a trial court can include either of the parties' 
premarital property in the marital estate, it must find 
unique circumstances that warrant disregarding the general 
rule that premarital property is separate property. See 
Burke, 733 P.2d at 135/ Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424-425. Those 
findings must be sufficiently detailed to show how the court 
distributed the parties' property. Marchant, 743 P. 2d at 
202-03. In the case at bar, the only relevant unique 
circumstance discussed by the trial court was the fact that 
Helen Walters helped arrange for and make improvements to 
Parcels 1 and 2. The court did not consider any of the 
other factors generally considered by courts when equitably 
distributing property pursuant to a divorce, see Burke, 733 
P.2d at 135, Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. Further, the 
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findings are insufficiently detailed to indicate how the 
trial court arrived at its decision. 
The trial court in the case at bar did not make adequate findings 
to support the award of an equitable interest in defendant's 
property. Further, the finding regarding defendant's 
contribution to the appreciation of plaintiff's home is not 
supported by the evidence. This issue must therefore be remanded 
for further findings consistent with the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law is very specific regarding the findings which must 
be made to support an award of alimony. In the case at bar, the 
alimony award is not supported by findings, but is instead based 
on a series of conclusions which leave this court without the 
ability to review the alimony award. Because the findings are 
inadequate, the usual marshaling standard does not apply. Based 
on the inadequacy of the findings, the order awarding alimony 
must be reversed and remanded for a determination which considers 
the necessary factors. 
Utah law presumes that premarital property remains with the 
party bringing the property into the marriage. When a trial 
court considers premarital property as part of an equitable 
distribution of property in a divorce case, there are 14 factors 
which should be considered by the trial court. In the case at 
bar, the court ignored the majority of the factors, and again 
simply set forth a series of conclusions. On the issue of 
contribution to the appreciation of the premarital asset the 
trial court did make a finding, but it is not supported by the 
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marshaled evidence. This finding should be reversed as not 
supported by the evidence. The balance of the findings must be 
remanded because the trial court failed to consider the required 
factors in awarding an equitable interest in plaintiff's 
premarital property. 
On review, it is evident that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding defendant alimony, and awarding an 
equitable interest in plaintiff's home. Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the court reverse this matter and remand it for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with 
those findings. Plaintiff further requests that the court issue 
instructions to the trial court indicating that: 
We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in 
bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached." 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App. 1990). In 
fleshing out findings of fact, the trial court may find that 
it reaches a different conclusion on remand. Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 199 (Utah App. 1992). 
DATED this ^ / day of January, 1998. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER & STIRLAND, P.C. 
• ? 
BY: ^^yu*M*£ <L ^fj^^*&^<z~ 
Darwin C. F i s h » ^ 
Donald E. McCandless 
Attorneys for Pla int i f f /Appel lant 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South 50 West 101-6 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
Telephone: (801)283-5055 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS DAVIS : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 964600100 
MONICA DAVIS : JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14th and 19th day of May, 1997, before 
the Honorable Louis G. Tervort. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Paul R. Frischknecht. Defendant appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Douglas 
L. Neeley. The Court, having considered the pleadings, having heard sworn testimony, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Sevier County, State of Utah, and 
have been for three months immediately prior to filing of this action. 
Davis v Davis 
Civil No. 964600100 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 16, 1992, in the City of Manti, County of 
Sanpete, State of Utah, and are presently married. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable differences 
that have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. Based thereon, it is 
reasonable and proper that the parties be granted a divorce one from the other. 
4. No children have been born as issue of this marriage and no children are expected. 
5. The Plaintiff is fully capable of supporting himself and to pay the obligations incurred 
during the marriage. 
6. The Defendant is in need of support from the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff has the ability to 
pay support based on his past and current income. Furthermore, the Defendant is entitled to live at 
the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage now that the parties are divorced. The Court 
finds that the Defendant's current situation and standard of living is less than what she enjoyed 
during the marriage and the Court awards alimony to the Defendant in order to more equalize the 
parties' respective current financial positions. Based thereon, the Defendant should be awarded a 
sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony from Plaintiff, beginning June 1, 1997, and 
continuing each month thereafter for a period of four (4) years, or until Defendant remarries, 
whichever occurs first. 
Davis v Davis 
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7. In reference to the issues brought before the Court regarding the parties' respective 
financial contributions to this marriage, the Court finds that the parties lived together, pooled their 
monies which money was spent by each party for marital purposes and from which each was 
benefitted. The Court cannot find from the evidence presented that either party was able to upsurp 
funds from the pool and use those funds for some unworthy purpose or in an attempt to hide the 
funds. Each party made significant contributions to the marriage and each contributed to the 
financial stability of the marriage. 
8. The Plaintiff should be awarded the home and real property acquired prior to this marriage 
relationship as his sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
9. The Court finds that the home had a value of $108,000 at the beginning of the marriage 
and that at the time of the separation of the parties, the home had a value of $132,000. Based 
thereon, the Court finds that the net equity in the home accumulated during the marriage amounts 
to $24,000 of which the Defendant should be awarded one-half (14). The Defendant helped make 
the payments on the home, make improvements to the home, and over-all participated in appreciative 
value of the home and real property during the marriage. 
Davis v Davis 
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10. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant should receive an equitable lien in the home and 
real property in the amount of $12,000, which represents one-half QA) of the equity acquired during 
the marriage. Said equity shall be payable to the Defendant over a period of three (3) years and shall 
carry no interest. Said equity shall be paid to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If 
Plaintiff fails to pay Defendant said equity within the three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall 
be awarded a judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and said judgment shall begin 
to accrue interest at the statutory rate beginning June 1, 2000. 
11. The Defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the 
Plaintiff upon full payment of said equity. 
12. The Defendant should be awarded the home and real property she has purchased since 
the date of separation as her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the Plaintiff, subject to 
the debt thereon and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
13. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties acquired personal property. 
The Plaintiff should be awarded the following personal property as his sole and exclusive property: 
A. To the Plaintiff from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 that he has marked. If the Defendant 
has them in her possession, she is to return them forthwith: 
1. Caller ID 
Davis v Davis 
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2. Yellow Quilt 
3. Coolers (Rob, Shan, Dennis) 
4. Quinn's Games and Nintendo 
5. Keys for Safe Deposit 
6. Portable Electric Heater 
7. Super Nintendo Plug 
8. Tow Ropes 
9. Extension Cords 
10. Fishing Gear 
B. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Plaintiffs Exhibit #4: 
1. 1995 4-Wheeler 
2. China Cabinet 
3. 1992 Plymouth Acclaim 
4. Velvet Blue Chair 
5. Tiller 
Davis v Davis 
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C. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Defendant's Exhibit #9 not awarded 
to the Defendant: 
1. LawnEdger 
2. Snow Plow 
3. Pistol 
4. Dishwasher 
5. One (1) Recliner 
6. Food Storage 
7. Kirby Vacuum 
8. Pictures & Knicknacks 
9. Big Screen TV 
10. Camcorder 
14. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties acquired personal property. 
The Defendant should be awarded the following personal property as her sole and exclusive 
property: 
A. To the Defendant from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 and from Defendant's Exhibit #9: 
1. 1996 GMC Truck 
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2. Ring 
3. Computer 
4. Health Rider 
5. Bar Stools 
6. Headboard 
7. Washer, Dryer, & Refrigerator 
8. Dirt Devil Vacuum 
9. Ice Cream Maker 
10. Green Chairs 
11. Yard Decorations 
12. One(l)Recliner 
13. Dish ware 
14. Yard Tools 
15. Trailer Hitch 
16. Christmas Decorations 
Davis v Davis 
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B. Defendant should be awarded her pre-marital property from Defendant's Exhibit 
#10. If the Plaintiff has them in his possession, he is to return them forthwith. 
1. Smith Corona Typewriter, Type Ribbons and Correction Ribbon 
2. Vacuum Accessories 
3. Two (2) Guitar Stands 
4. Pistol (acquired prior to marriage) 
5. Pictures (including granddaughter's blessing pictures) 
6. Christmas Tree Stand 
7. Wood Stand 
8. Kitchen Items 
9. Games (Rummy Cube, Sorry and Clue) 
10. Country Western Tapes Marked with MD 
11. Gold Chain Necklace 
12. Flashlight 
13. Tools 
14. Hummel Figurine 
15. Lawn Spreader 
Davis v Davis 
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16. Easter Decorations 
17. Life Jackets 
18. Kitchen plates & decorations 
19. Silver Chain 
20. Two (2) Crock Pots 
21. Yardsticks 
22. Orange Extension Cord 
23. Wreath in Bathroom 
24. Bath Towels, Sheets, & Pillow Cases 
C. The parties should be ordered to return any items listed that they may have in their 
possession that is awarded to the other party. 
15. Each party should be awarded, as their sole and exclusive property, any and all 
outstanding bank accounts, certificate of deposits, savings accounts, annuities and/or any other 
accounts that bear their separate names. 
16. It is fair and reasonable that the parties should each be ordered to assume and pay, and 
hold the other harmless from liability on, all separate debts and obligations incurred by them since 
the date of separation, June 6? 1996. 
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17. The Court finds that the household bills incurred prior to the parties' separation and paid 
by the Plaintiff should be off-set against the monies taken from the Defendant's savings account by 
the Credit Union and applied towards the truck payments during the three (3) months that the 
Plaintiff had the use and possession of the 1996 GMC truck. 
18. Each party should be awarded their respective insurance policies as their sole and 
exclusive property including any and all cash values therein. 
19. Each party should be awarded their own retirement and/or profit sharing plans through 
their respective employment or otherwise. 
20. Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
in prosecuting this action. 
21. It is reasonable and proper that the Defendant be restored the use of her former name, 
Durfee. 
22. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
23. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein, 
that party should be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs 
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce. 
Davis v Davis 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the parties 
are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final upon 
entry by the Court herein. 
3. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the Court 
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS DAVIS 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Civil No. 964600100 
MONICA DAVIS : JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14th and 19th day of May, 1997, before 
the Honorable Louis G. Tervort. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Paul R. Frischknecht. Defendant appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Douglas 
L. Neeley. The Court, having considered the pleadings, having heard sworn testimony, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE THAT: 
1. The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing by and between 
the Plaintiff and Defendant be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby awarded 
Davis v Davis 
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a Decree of Divorce from each other, said Decree to become absolute and final upon entry by the 
Court herein. 
2. The Defendant is awarded a sum of not less than $500.00 per month as alimony from 
Plaintiff, beginning June 1,1997, and continuing each month thereafter for a period of four (4) years, 
or until Defendant remarries, whichever occurs first. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the home and real property acquired prior to this marriage 
relationship as his sole and exclusive property, subject to the debt thereon and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
4. The Defendant is awarded an equitable lien in the home and real property in the amount 
of $12,000, which represents one-half (Vi) of the equity acquired during the marriage. Said equity 
shall be payable to the Defendant over a period of three (3) years and shall carry no interest. Said 
equity shall be paid to the Defendant in full on or before June 1, 2000. If Plaintiff fails to pay 
Defendant said equity within the three (3) year period of time, Defendant shall be awarded a 
judgment against Plaintiff for any amounts left unpaid and said judgment shall begin to accrue 
interest at the statutory rate beginning June 1, 2000. 
5. The Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the Plaintiff upon 
full payment of said equity. 
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6. The Defendant is awarded the home and real property she has purchased since the date 
of separation as her sole and exclusive property, with no interest in the Plaintiff, subject to the debt 
thereon and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. The Plaintiff is awarded the following personal property as his sole and exclusive 
property: 
A. To the Plaintiff from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 that he has marked. If the Defendant 
has them in her possession, she is to return them forthwith: 
1. Caller ID 
2. Yellow Quilt 
3. Coolers (Rob, Shan, Dennis) 
4. Quinn's Games and Nintendo 
5. Keys for Safe Deposit 
6. Portable Electric Heater 
7. Super Nintendo Plug 
8. Tow Ropes 
9. Extension Cords 
10. Fishing Gear 
Davis v Davis 
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B. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Plaintiffs Exhibit #4: 
1. 1995 4-Wheeler 
2. China Cabinet 
3. 1992 Plymouth Acclaim 
4. Velvet Blue Chair 
5. Tiller 
C. Plaintiff is awarded the following items from Defendant's Exhibit #9 not awarded 
to the Defendant: 
1. LawnEdger 
2. Snow Plow 
3. Pistol 
4. Dishwasher 
5. One (l)Recliner 
6. Food Storage 
7. Kirby Vacuum 
8. Pictures & Knicknacks 
9. Big Screen TV 
Davis v Davis 
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10. Camcorder 
8. The Defendant is awarded the following personal property as her sole and exclusive 
property: 
A. To the Defendant from Plaintiffs Exhibit #3 and from Defendant's Exhibit #9: 
1. 1996 GMC Truck 
2. Ring 
3. Computer 
4. Health Rider 
5. Bar Stools 
6. Headboard 
7. Washer, Dryer, & Refrigerator 
8. Dirt Devil Vacuum 
9. Ice Cream Maker 
10. Green Chairs 
11. Yard Decorations 
12. One(l)Recliner 
13. Dishware 
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14. Yard Tools 
15. Trailer Hitch 
16. Christmas Decorations 
B. Defendant is awarded her pre-marital property from Defendant's Exhibit #10. If 
the Plaintiff has them in his possession, he is to return them forthwith. 
1. Smith Corona Typewriter, Type Ribbons and Correction Ribbon 
2. Vacuum Accessories 
3. Two (2) Guitar Stands 
4. Pistol (acquired prior to marriage) 
5. Pictures (including granddaughter's blessing pictures) 
6. Christmas Tree Stand 
7. Wood Stand 
8. Kitchen Items 
9. Games (Rummy Cube, Sony and Clue) 
10. Country Western Tapes Marked with MD 
11. Gold Chain Necklace 
12. Flashlight 
Davis v Davis 
Civil No. 964600100 
Decree of Divorce 
Page 7 
13. Tools 
14. Hummel Figurine 
15. Lawn Spreader 
16. Easter Decorations 
17. Life Jackets 
18. Kitchen plates & decorations 
19. Silver Chain 
20. Two (2) Crock Pots 
21. Yardsticks 
22. Orange Extension Cord 
23. Wreath in Bathroom 
24. Bath Towels, Sheets, & Pillow Cases 
C. The parties are ordered to return any items listed that they may have in their 
possession that is awarded to the other party. 
9. Each party is awarded, as their sole and exclusive property, any and all outstanding bank 
accounts, certificate of deposits, savings accounts, annuities and/or any other accounts that bear their 
separate names. 
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10. The parties are each ordered to assume and pay, and hold the other harmless from 
liability on, all separate debts and obligations incurred by them since the date of separation, June 6, 
1996. 
11. Each party is awarded their respective insurance policies as their sole and exclusive 
property including any and all cash values therein. 
12. Each party is awarded their ov/n retirement and/or profit sharing plans through their 
respective employment or otherwise. 
13. Each party is ordered to assume his/her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
14. Defendant is restored the use of her former name, Durfee. 
15. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required 
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
16. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein, 
that party will be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs 
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce. 
Davis v Davis 
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APPENDIX I I 
EXHIBIT 
DEFENDANT'S CONTRIBUTION TO MARITAL HOME 
Total House Payments made: August 1992 through June 6, 1996 
47 months @ $l,206.84/mo = $56,721.48 
Improvements Made to Home During Marriage 
Improvement Approximate Cost 
Installed gas line into home 
Installed built-in china cabinet 
Installed gas fireplace 
Fixed hot-tub 
Replaced garage door opener 
Landscaped yard 
Wallpaperd rooms 
Installed smoke alarms 
Installed shower door 
Installed lights and mirror 
$3,000 
2,000 
2,000 
225 
350 
3,000 
700 
750 
200 
300 
$12,525 
TOTAL PAYMENTS ON HOME MORTGAGE & IMPROVEMENTS $69,246.48 
APPENDIX III 
SERVICE LINE 
APPLICATION 
AND AGREEMENT 
• MOUNTAIN FUEL 
D Rata Chang* 
D Updata 
D Nam* Chang* 
D Additional Us* 
Deconversion 
Q N*w S*rvic* 
D S*rvie* Chang* 
• Stub Completion 
D R*instat* 
• R*plac*m*nt 
CUST_TYPE 
Q*T4«sid«ntia! 
• Commercial 
D Lg. Comm 
O Non-r*sid 
D Industnal 
M W O 
CERTIFICATION NUMBERS 
Sl/BLDG NO 
RVWFILE 
ACCOUNT NO, 7 - 7 
?'s-r*y SERVICE UNE WO 
/J-9X3 PROJECT NO 
APPUCANT AND SERVICE LOCATION INFORMATION 
LAST NAME 
Pa/ ? AODRESS 
FIRST NAME INK PHONE NO 
SUBDIVISION 
/ s 
LOT NO 
O W N E R AND CLEARANCE CONTACT INFORMATION 
LAST NAME FIRST NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE - ZPCOOE 
CrTYOPiCOUNTf
 / STATE^ ZIPCOOE CONTACT FOR CLEARANCE PHONE NO 
MAILING ADDRESS CITY ZIP COOE' 
MAP 
/<?--,? /?=V 
ZONE RAX AREA 
ff^A^ */V 
MAIN INFORMATION 
• Twin 
D Short Side 
D-Long Side 
• Stub Completion 
^ 
LTPIastic 
D Steel 
PRESSURE 
LTlHP 
DHP 
DLP 
PERMIT SERVICE SPECIFICATIONS ORIGL INSTALL DATE 
DCity 
D County 
aStat*Hwy 
ONon* 
LENGTH DIAMETER 
v: 
TYPE 
ET*Plast»c 
O Steel 
NOOE 
METER SET DATE 
OTHER/EXISTING APPLIANCES E LP W C O S 
HEATING Pnmafv tL Secondary tL/S 
Wtr HT & Rano* £~ OtyrJgZ 
Oth*r Applrahc* Fuel 
SKETCH AND 
METER SET 
INFORMATION : * * V ^ 
^Cr^jLyp5o Drus. V 
7*>orA,x+ 
# i 
$ 
fj*M-
'-An 
NORTH 
IiL 
METER RISER LOCATION H L CATI N . , / / / / 
£>rhAir ( fa 
METER SET 
Qlnsid* 
QdOtsid* 
METER PROTECTION 
f fta/Q 
OMoTBoquirad 
• By Applicant 
O Bv MFS 
METER PAD 
ETtfot Required 
Q By Applicant 
D Bv MFS 
PAD DIMENSIONS 
"Ah 
MULTI-FAMILY 
No of Units 
PRIORITY 
D-FInish*d 
D Framing 
O Drywall 
O Foundation 
STATUS CODE 
D Not Contractabl* D No 
D Yes O Not Horn* 
CONNECTED EQUIP 
DESCRIPTION 
IU/ S"? 
>A!./„HV« 
"t T*r 
^ r 
JL 
TOTAL EXISTING (E) 
TOTAL NEW (N) or 
TOTAL AOOfTldNAL (A) 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
CONSUMPTION 
CF.DAY 
M. 
J^± 
'30 
.vicFnreiW 
1 PRECONSTRUCTION CHARGES 
1 Service Une 
| Excess Footage — 
| Service Une Change 
|_ Excess Costs 
p PAYMENT TERMS 
O Cash D N*t 30 days 
a Check O Customer P 0 # 
h <^f, jJg<^ TC^F^OJBigjfetlS^Ot>lER 
F^MPAft |gC|Bfg 
SIZE 
]A / * 
FOOTAGE 
9/ 
* / 
RECEIPT # 
COST/FT 
- ^ ^ -
_ -
AMOUNT 
4 ^ 
BOMBBSM] A 
" Yfasp tf(*J? " 
Custonier willing to negotiate excess charge for frost • Yes/Jy Q No 
a<#ft#Mfa 
Applicant agrees to pay to Mountain Fuel Supply Company the"amount shown above as "Preconstruction Charged" and further agrees to use natural gas forihe purposes fisted in the J* 
connected equipment descnption at the above addres? within jwo (2> years fronithrdate otiflsiajjation of the service line or to pay the^oropeny $ /ri^LJ per foot for a distance 
°f tff teet wnic" totals % «7^%?^f>^ ~ plus rfr*'fi % annual interest the Company's authorized pn tax rate of return Interest accrues from the date 
of completion* of faalrties f Distance" means^he length of pipe installed from the Company s main to the meter nser location^. Customer will also pay any legal costs, including Attorney 
fees and collection costs incurred in collecting unpaid default amounts In addition to Mountain Fuel's Rules and Regulations wfrich-a» on file and have been approved by the Pubfc 
Service Commission of the State in which this service is rendered THE CONDITIONS, AGREEMENTS, AND PREREQUtSTTES ON THEREVERSE SIDE ARE A PART OF THE 
CONTRACT. THIS CONTRACT SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE ONLY AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY MOUNTAIN FUEL AND DEPOSIT OF AN EXECUTED COPY IN THE UNTOD 
STATES MAIL ADDRESSED TO APPLICANT AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS 
(Jr. ' ihL 
Mountain Fuel Supply Bv X ^J^c^fiC 
AGREED Applicant 
ACCEPTED 
By. Title 
~ / Date x ii: J / ~-
< , / g V K Title ! V / ^ / / y /^9srj~S„<^ in^-Oatt ^/-r-f? 
FORM 123 (3 92) 
APPENDIX IV 
mm PBDDmns 
350 East 400 North 
Centerfield, Utah 84622 
CUSTOMER COPY 
READY MIX CONCRETE 
ASPHALT PAVING 
SOLD TO * ^ x ^ f>.^\ 
BATCH P L A N T L O C A T I O N S : 
<Aurora -^529-7496 
MTPIeasant - 462-2058 
Manti - 835-4331 
Centerfield - 528-7279 
Huntington - 687-9807 
NO. 12920 
DATE . 
CUST 
ORDER NO 
MAILING 
ADDRESS TOT CU YDS 
SPECIAL 
INSTRUCTIONS 
—r— DELIVERY 
ADDRESS <>£ /GC M £ t « ' h i ic (c
l LOT 
NO 
CEMENT 
BAGS MIX 
CEMENT 
TYPE 
WATER 
PER YD 
% OF ASTM 
AEA 
AREAS QUANTITY 
PR 
UNIT PRICE TOTAL 
t H e - v; 0,0 l^fC^-<. 
L r» *v^<J v^a ^th^'-^i 
-y""<Tic-<-l I^.Cd JK 
S d 
tf^" 5 " / J -*+ <?.C'Z'' <^P ~ 
- J <rJ A / F 6 :b > ?7^7: 
LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE 
DRAYAGE PART LOAD DELIVERY CHARGE 
EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE REASON FOR EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE 
FINISH LOAD • WHEELBARROW • BOND BEAM • 
TOPPING BASEMENT • CRANE JOB D BROKEN FORM Q 
CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT • SEE REVERSE SICE D 
30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders s^er 
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed 
SUB-TOTAL J 
STATE TAX 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT 
Our drivers will make every effort to 
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company 
assumes no responsibility for damages inside curb or property 
line Customo^asges to terms of sale and delivery and 
Due to important factors which are out 
lehvery, this Company will not accept 
Jished results 
•turned concrete 
pntrained unless otherwise specified 
IMPORTANT: Additional water 
added to this concrete will reduce 
i ts strength. Any water added is 
at customer's own risk. 
WATER ACOED ON JOB 
AT CUSTOMER S REQUEST 
ESTIMATED 
SLUMP 
•oilcving date of purchase In the event 
da/s after due date I or we agree to pay 
it or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee 
[of 2% per month (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
ive ail ngnts to claim exemption under state 
agent constitutes acceptance of the above 
YAND v 
EEDTO A -
Gal 
TRUCK DRIVER 
L{jL'<~C. 
THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR 
FOOT.NG • WALL Q FLOOR • 
FOUNDATION • FORMS • DRIVEWAY D 
STE=S • PATIO • D 
SIDEWALK D CURB & GUTTER D OTHER D 
OWNER OR AGENT 
AURORA 529*7496 
MT. PLEASANT 462-2058 
MANTI 835-4331 
HUNTINGTON 687-9132 
ASPHALT-SAND AND GRAVEL 
CENTERFIELD, UTAH~84e: 
(801) 528-7279 
READY-MIX CONCRE'7 
r 
s 
o 
L 
D 
DENNIS DAVIS 
2 3 3 £AST 7 0 0 NORTH 
R I O - F I E L D J UT 8«*70i 
\ INVD^CH NO.) 
H*S065 
DATE \ CUSTOMER HO \ 
I 
i 
LOCATOR 
a. u— 
L _ _ J 
JOB 
ADDRESS. 
PURCHASE ORDER. 
JOB NUMBER 
DATE 
v— •» ^ - H H 
TICKET DESCRIPTION \ 
2 2 6 1 1 6 0 0 CEMENT 
QUANTITY PRICE 
55*000 
T -
AMOUNT 
1 9 : 
DISCOUNT ALLOWED • IF PAID ON OR BY 
ALL ACCOUNTS ARE DUE ON THE 15th OF THE FOLLOWING MONTH IN 
WHICH THE SALE WAS MADE A FINANCE CHARGE OF V/2% PER MONTH (ANNUAL RATE OF 18°o) WILL 
BE CHARGED ON ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE, IN-
TEREST WILL SE CHARGED UNTIL PAID ALSO COLLECTION COSTS AND ATTORNEY S FEES 
CUSTOMS?. ZZ- { 
SUB TOTAL 
SALES TAX 
AMOUNT DUE 
350 East 400 North 
Centerfield, Utah 84622 
STATEMENT COPY 
Y MIX CONCRETE 
ASPHALT PAVING 
BAFGW PLANT LOCATIONS: 
<Auj£raJ- 529-7496 
Mt Pleasant - 462-2058 
Manti- 835-4331 
- Centerfield - 528-7279 
Huntington - 687-9807 
SOLD TO 
VJ <*/-<^q\ S < i r ^ 5 r n 
MAILING 
ADDRESS 
Q^v/Avjis ^ y v v A S 
DATE 
CUST 
ORDER NO. . 
NO. 22611 
SPECIAL 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TOT CU YDS 171 
ADR^VISRSY 3 7* E ^ o N, £ ^ f . c \ A ^ 
CEMENT /
 M 
BAGS MIX w 
AREAS 
Psrrxxs-t 
O^oo^ 
CEMENT 1~V 
TYPE •s-J' 
[ QUANTITY 
v/7v?o 
\C^*& 
^ 
REASON FOR EXCESSIVE 
UNLOADING CHARGE 
FINISH LOAD • WHEELBARROW 
TOPPING BASEMENT Q CRANE 
WATER Q < " 
PER YD \ -> 
1 
^1^3 rc^r^"hw 
LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE 
DRAYAttF P A R T L 0 A D UMAYA^t DELIVERY CHARGE 
PR 
EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE 
D BOND BEAM • 
IOR P I nnnk-cw P O P M 1 1 
CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT • SEE REVERSE SIDE • 
30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders over 
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed 
%OFASTM O \ 
ABA ~ 
i UNIT PRICE 
L<fGv^t 
\Lc\&"\ 
1 TOTAL 
(3 : 
1 17 r 
5T^4 
SUB-TOTAL 
STATE TAX, 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT: 
Our drivers will make every effort to 
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company 
assumes no responsibility tor damages inside- curb or property 
line Customer agrees to terms of sale and delivery and 
accepts concrete as is Due to important factors which are out 
of our control after delivery, this Company will not accept 
responsibility for the finished results 
No credit allowed for returned concrete 
Ail concrete air entrained unless otherwise specified 
IMPORTANT: Additional water 
added to this concrete will reduce 
i ts strength. Any water added is 
at customer's own risk. 
WATER ADDED CN JOB 
AT CUSTOMED S REQUEST 
ESTIMATED 
SLUMP 
CONDITION O F S A L E : 
All accounts due 15th of month following date of purchase In the event 
payment is not made within 30 days after aue date I or jve agree to pay 
if collection is made by suit or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee 
plus a FINANCE CHARGE of 2% per rronth (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE 24%) and hereby waive all nghts to Cairn exemption under statf 
laws Signature by owner or agent constitutes acfe/tayceyDf jjje abov/ 
RECEIVED BY AND yj 
TERMS AGREED TO A 
Gal. 
TRUCK 37 D£>vo !£L. 
THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR 
FOOTING D WALL • FLOOR • 
FOUNDATION • FORMS • DRIVEWAY • 
STEPS • PATIO • • 
(SlbEWALK D CURB & GUTTER D OTHER D 
\U^" 
OWNER OR AGENT 
BATCH LOCATIONS 
AURORA 529^7496 ' 
MT rt£A§ANT 462-2058 
MANTI 835-4331 
HUNTINGTON 687-9132 
ASPHALT-SAND AND GRAVEL 
CENTERFIELD, UTAH 84622 
(801) 528-7279 
READY-MIX CONCRETE 
S 
O 
L 
D 
CENNIS DA*-IS 
238 EAST 700 NOPTH 
RICHFIELD* UT S4-701 
~1 INVOICENO 
4-7090 
DATE | CUSTOMER NO 
S-2C-93 3 i £ i 
1 
LOCATION 
i l 
L _ 
JOB 
ADDRESS. 
_J 
PURCHASE ORDER. 
JOB NUMBER 
DATE TICKET DESCRIPTION QUANTITY PRICE AMOUNT 
3 - ? ? - ? 3 6 0 !> CEMEN"1 
DISCOUNT ALLOWED • IF PAID ON OR BY 
ALL ACCOUNTS ARE DUE ON THE 15th OF THE FOLLOWING MONTH IN 
WHICH THE SALE WAS MADE A FINANCE CHARGE OF 1Vo PER MONTH (ANNUAL RATE OF 18%) WILL 
BE CHARGED CN ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE IN-
TEREoT Wk_L RE C-iARGED UNTIL PAID ALSO COLLECTION COSTS. ^ND A H P ^ N ^ Y S FEES 
SUB TOTAL 
SALES TAX 
AMOUNT DUE 
^BATCH PLANT LOCATIONS: 
RQCK PRODUCTS 
350 East 400 North 
Centerfield, Utah 84622 
SOLDTO ± > e V M ( fe O ^ V / S 
L_Aurora> 529-7496 
\Mt Hieas 
READY MIX CONCRETE 
ASPHALT PAVING 
T ant - 462-2058 
Manti - 835-4331 
Centerfield-528-7279 
Huntington - 687-9807 
No. 32337 
MAILING 
ADDRESS 
SPECIAL 
INSTRUCTIONS 
DATE _ 
CUST 
ORDER 
TOT CI 
5T-3'-77 
NO _ 
J YDS 
_2& 
^im^fE. ?oo/^t H^utetiM. N°OT 
CEMENT / I 
BAGS MIX C P 
AREAS 
/jmv*. 
iA^ioa^ 
CEMENT / / " 
TYPE ^LM-
QUANTITY 
$.oS~ 
G)'-*l 
3'/*y& 
REASON FOR EXCESSIVE 
UNLOADING CHARGE 
FINISH LOAD • WHEELBARROW 
TOPPING RA^FMFNT f~~i PRANF 
WATER 
PER YD 
* I a«fc 
X T 
6b^{v*is. 
LATE HOUR DELIVERY CHARGE 
DRAYAGE P A R T L 0 A D UMATAUt D E L I V E R Y CHARGE 
PR 
EXCESSIVE UNLOADING CHARGE 
• BOND BEAM • 
irna ! I DOZ-M/CM C A D U I ! 
CUSTOMER DELAY IN PLACEMENT • SEE REVERSE SIDE D 
30 minutes free unloading time up to and including 6 cubic yards On orders over 
6 yards an additional 5 minutes per yard will be allowed 
%OFASTM T } t 
AEA OC \ 
UNIT PRICE 
leavt 
&tck 
St.crD 
SUB TOTAL 
STATE TAX 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT: 
TOTAL 
* 3 • 
.3 
^ 
4 
i 
•4 
' t . 
Our drivers will make every effort to 
place matenal where Customer designates but the Company 
assumes no responsibility for damages inside curb or property 
line Customer agrees to terms of sale and delivery and 
accepts concrete as is Due to important factors which are out 
of our control after delivery this Company will not accept 
responsibility for the finished results 
No credit allowed for returned concrete 
AH concrete air entrained unless otherwise specified 
IMPORTANT: Addit ional water 
added to this concrete wi l l reduce 
its strength. Any water added is 
at customer's own risk. 
WATER ADDED ON JOB 
AT CUSTOMER S REQUEST 
?" 
CONDITION OF S A L E : 
All accounts due 15th of month following date of purchase In the event 
payment is not made within 30 days after due date I or we agree to pay 
if collection is made by suit or otherwise a reasonable attorney s fee 
plus a FINANCE CHARGE of 2 % per month (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE 24%) and hereby waive ail ngnts to claim et tmptwa under state 
laws Signature by owner or agent constitutes acceptance of the above 
RECEIVED BY AND w 
TERMS AGREED TO A 
"MATE! 
SLUM-
Gal 
TRUCK 
_£/ 
THIS CONCRETE IS USED FOR 
FOOTING • WALL Q FLOOR \Z 
FOUNDATION • FORMS D R I V E W A Y G 
^ S T E P S ULr PATIO | f l C 
, ; g f P E W A L K / & C U R B & GUTTER D OTHER C 
OWNER OR AGENT 
APPENDIX V 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #4 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE 
RESPECTIVE POSSESSION AND VALUES 
DENNIS MONICA 
ITEM 
4-WHEELER 
CHINA CABINET 
CAR 
CHAIR 
TILLER 
VALUE 
5,400.00 QzkJl 
2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 6*db{*^ 
1 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 
230 .00 
650 .00 
ITEM VALUE 
TOTALS $ 9 , 6 8 0 . 0 0 
TRUCK 
RING 
COMPUTER 
CAMCORDER 
HEALTH RIDER 
BAR STOOLS 
HEADBOARD 
LAWN EDGER 
WASHER, DRYER, FRIG 
DIRT DEVIL VACUUM 
ICE CREAM MAKER 
GREEN CHAIRS 
YARD DECOR. 
16 
2 
3 
1 
- 1 
$25 
,000.00 
,200.00 
,400.00 
^^fl C\C\ f J D U • \j\J — 
500.00 
280.00 
240.00 
238.00 1 
,000.00 
65.00 
60.00 
65.00 
500.00 
,898.00 
Pic i* 
p Us*. 
0 i/), K tC 
^PUUNTlFFSEXHIBr^ 
BMOTH0. x. 
CASEN0. 96&-/0Q 
DATERECD ^ . . _w 
IN EVIDENCE £ £ £ £ £ . 
CLERK A^cv 
